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STOCK EXCHANGE INTERCONNECTIONS
AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DATA EXCHANGE
by
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If philosophical  cybernetics was interested in stock exchanges,  it  would probably
treat them as relatively simple information structures. From that perspective, stock
exchanges can be  viewed as places  where  data  on supply and demand of various
negotiable instruments are processed. Besides that, stock exchanges, as institutions,
provide  respective  transactions  with additional  informational  (organisational)
value that mostly consist of trust regarding the traders, clearing etc.
Consequently,  a stock  exchange  interconnection  can  be  seen  as very  natural
process  providing  for bigger  pool  of useful  data.  One  of key  tasks
in the establishment  of exchange  schemes  is  then  not  to hinder  or diminish
the added information value, i.e. to at least keep the existing level of trust. In that
sense, one of the most important components of interconnection design is the legal
compliance.
In the comment, we will examine some of the most emerging legal issues in data
sharing between stock exchanges that were subject to examination under recently
concluded project ‘Creating a legal and regulatory framework for interconnections
between  stock  exchanges:  A comparative  study  of the UK  and Taiwan’  funded
by the British Academy (UK) and the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan.
We will  particularly focus in this comment on compliance issues in cross-border
transfers  of personal  data  and newly  emerging  regulatory  phenomenon
of cybersecurity.
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1. VIRTUALISED STOCK EXCHANGE
One of must-sees  of the Chicago  Institute  of Art  is  the original  Chicago
Stock  Exchange  Trading  Room.  The reconstructed  creation  of Dankmar
Adler  and Louis  Sullivan  nicely  demonstrates  the wealth  and style
of America’s second city at the end of the nineteenth century. It also shows
how architectural aesthetics was important for stock exchanges of that time.
Good  (rich)  looking  building  and trading  room  was  an asset  that  was
for a stock exchange as inevitable as its listing program or trading services.
Times  have  changed  and stock  exchange  is  not  defined  any  more
with immovable assets. Today, the CHX does not even mention its building
or trading  room on its  website.  It  is  then  reasonable  to ask  what  defines
today  a stock  exchange  or more  provocatively  what  defines  today
a financial market.1 Subsequently, one might even ask what defines a stock
exchange or a financial market not only today but as such.2
The reason  we  always  tend  to ask  these  questions  in connection
to technological  developments  was  earlier  described  by Pierre  Lévy
as virtualisation.3 Lévy  demonstrated  that  technology  from time  to time
allows  or even  makes  us  to reshape  various  societal  phenomena.
Technologies  in that  case  do  not  affect  the very  nature,  or core,  of those
phenomena, but might substantially change their forms. Virtualised money
still  act  as a value-bearer,  yet  they  have,  compared  to paper  money,  no
tangible form.
It  is  a bit  tricky  to treat  ‘virtual’  as an opposite  to ‘real’.  Our  feelings
to ‘virtual’  friends  are  as real  as those  to ‘real’  ones  similarly  as a value
represented  by money  is  supposed  to be  ‘real’  regardless  of whether  its
bearer is tangible or electronic. Thus, virtuality is not the opposite of reality
but its another form.4
1 Introduction  of trust  technologies  even  evokes  a question  whether  financial  institutions
such  as stock  exchanges  represent  defining  element  of financial  markets  as such –  see
for example  Reyes, C. L.  (2016)  Moving  Beyond  Bitcoin  to an Endogenous  Theory
of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal.  Villanova Law Review,
61, p. 191.
2 Carran  asks  a similar  question  regarding  the nature  and purpose  of stock  exchanges
and cites the following passage from House of Lords decision in Weinberger v Inglis [1919]
A.C. 606, HL 1: ‘The London Stock Exchange is in reality a building vested in certain proprietors
and used  for the purpose  of carrying  on a market  for stocks  and shares.’  See  Caran, P. C.  (1975
–1978) Some Aspects of the Stock Exchange:  Its Nature and Functions.  Victoria University
Wellington Law Review, 8, p. 71.
3 See Lévy, P. (2002) Becoming Virtual – Reality in the Digital Age. New York: Plenum Trade.
4 See Lévy, P. (1997) Welcome to virtuality. Digital Creativity, 8(1), p. 3.
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Virtualisation causes some old problems to disappear, while new ones
instantly  pop  up.5 It  is  typical  that  namely  problems  associated
with physical place (or placement) entirely vanish, because virtualisation is
normally accompanied with loss  of substance (or tangibility). On the contrary,
new problems of virtualised phenomena are typically linked with various
technology risks. A success of virtualisation can be called a situation when
those  problems  that  fell  off  had  been  worse  than  those  that  newly
emerged –  which  means  that  not  all  societal  phenomena  are  fit
for virtualisation all the time.
It  is  also  important  to properly  distinguish  between mere  substantive
core and formal elements to master the virtualisation of some phenomenon,
let  it  be  friendship,  money,  justice  or anything  else.  The identification
of the core  can  provide  for a protection  of respective  phenomenon
from substantive  erosion.6 At the same  time,  properly  knowing  which
elements of virtualised phenomenon are just formal enables us to maximise
various  positive  effects  of virtualisation,  prevent  unnecessary  defects
and prepare for necessary ones.7
The fact that we see today the original Chicago Stock Exchange Trading
Room  as a gallery  object  and that  it  was  not  replaced  at the CHX
by anything  even architecturally  or aesthetically  fancier  shows that  stock
exchanges simply got virtualised in past decades. It is then not only thanks
to the use  of ICT  that  trading  rooms  (i.e. physical  locations  where  trade
deals are made) do not represent core facilities of stock exchanges any more,
but thanks  to natural  tendency  of stock  exchanges  to develop  further
and to liberate  trading  from various  obstacles.  In this  case,  virtualisation
was  probably  quite  successful,  because  the problems  lost  (i.e. direct
dependence  of trading  on physical  presence  of traders  on the floor
of the trading  room)  seem  to be  more  serious  than  those  that  newly
emerged (incl. the loss of aesthetic amusement of traders).8
5 For  a detailed  study  regarding  particular  virtualisation  of financial  markets,  see  Chiu,
I. H-Y. (2016) Journal of Technology Law & Policy, 21, p. 55.
6 When Trautman and Harell discuss the use of bitcoin technology for financial transactions,
they  start  with the question  as ‘what  is  money’.  See  Trautmann, L. J.,  Harell, A. C.  (2017)
Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives? Cardozo Law Review, 38, p. 1041.
7 See  for example  Batog, C. Blockchain:  A Proposal  to Reform  High  Frequency  Trading
Regulation. Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 33, p. 739.
8 See  for example  Engelen, P.-J.  (2006)  Changes  in the Securities  Trading  Landscape
in Europe and the U.S. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 1, p. 439.
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The example  of the CHX  also  demonstrates  that  neither  architectural
aesthetics  nor  physical  presence  of traders  represent  core  elements
of the phenomenon of a stock exchange.  Both these features were already
almost entirely lost with the introduction of ICT, but the stock exchange still
exists and operates as a stock exchange.
2. INTERCONNECTIONS AS MEANS
OF STOCK EXCHANGE VIRTUALISATION
Stock  exchange  interconnections9 represent  yet  another  way
of virtualisation  of stock  exchanges.  Interconnections  are  possible  thanks
to ICT  and their  purpose  is  to make  further  use  of already  present
dematerialisation  of stock  trading.  Similar  with the shift  from physical
to virtual  trading  rooms,  interconnections  bring  a shift  from trading
at multiple  hubs  to trading  at one  place.  While  virtualisation  of a trading
room  introduced  a possibility  to trade  between  members  who  are  not
physically present at one place (in the trading room), interconnections make
possible trading stock that is not available on local market.10
We noted above that virtualisation of any kind can be successful only
if we get right the fundaments of respective phenomenon. Only then we can
make proper use of its positive effects and successfully tackle in sufficient
advance newly emerging problems.
Every stock exchange can be viewed from the perspective of information
theory as a system that processes data. Stock exchange receives input data
about  offer  and demand  and turns  them  into information  by adding
an extra  value  to them  and matching  them  together.  Particularly,  stock
exchanges provide for concentrated and structured access to respective data
(offer  and demand  incl.  accompanying  data)  and they  also  increase
informational  value of that  data by business  trust related to offered stock
and consequent  clearance.11 From that  perspective,  traders  pay  stock
exchanges for extra value that consists primarily of efficient access to stock
market (from both sides) and transactional credibility.
9 The phenomenon of stock Exchange  interconnections  was  recently  examined in a project
funded by the British Academy (UK) and the Ministry of Science and Technology of Taiwan
and titled:  Creating a legal  and regulatory framework for interconnections between stock
exchanges: A comparative study of the UK and Taiwan. Further findings presented in this
paper are primarily based on research undertaken within that project.
10 Interconnections thus bring significantly different effects in comparison with mergers – see
for example Kokkoris, I. and Olivares-Caminal, R. (2007–2008) Some Issues on Cross-Border
Stock Exchange Mergers, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 29(2), p. 455.
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Any virtualisation,  if it  is  to do  no harm to primary functions  of stock
exchanges, must preserve the aforesaid way in which stock exchanges turn
data into information. Interconnections bring the opportunity for more data
(on supply and demand side) to enter the stock exchange. One kind of risk
then  arises  from different  compliance  standards  of data  that  are  being
exchanged  through  the interconnection.  Apart  general  stock  regulatory
issues  (i.e. differences  between  stock  market  regulations  in different
jurisdictions),  we  must  tackle  issues  related  to data  rights  compliance
(e.g. there are sui generis rights to databases in the EU, while no such rights
exist anywhere else in the world).
The second type of legally relevant risks with regards to data that arise
from stock  exchange  interconnections  relate  to security.  Stock  exchanges
have  always  been  extremely  cautious  about  data  security,  because  any
breaches can seriously harm their reputation. Data security issues can also
hugely  affect  one  of aforesaid  reasons  for which  traders  use  stock
exchanges,  i.e. transactional  trust.  Thus,  substantive  information  systems
of stock exchanges are highly secured which also means they are isolated
from the rest of the internet to maximum possible extent.
Interconnection  always  means  opening  the information  system
and exposing  it  to external  sources  of data.  Apart  the aforesaid  problem
of differences  in substantive  standards  between stock  markets  (incl.  legal
compliance),  there  is  substantial  increase  of risk  caused  by distant
communication. Stock exchanges can never be directly connected, so there
is always a need for an information intermediary (e.g. a telecommunications
provider).
While  geographic  distance  is  relevant  as such  (i.e. it  represents  a risk
factor),  there  is  no  direct  correlation  between  the distance
and the possibility of stock exchange interconnections. Other sorts of trade
relations  between  different  nations  often  depend,  for obvious  reasons,
on geographic  proximity.  As data  can  travel  at any  distance,  there  is  no
practical  difference  in establishment  of stock  exchange  interconnections
between any places in the world. In other words, once the above issues are
11 This  function  of stock  exchanges  may partly  vanish  in near  future  with the introduction
of technologies  that  will  provide  for trusted  authentication  and confidentiality –  see
for example Lee, L. (2017) New Kids on the Blockchain: How Bitcoin's Technology Could
Reinvent  the Stock  Market,  Hastings  Business  Law  Journal,  12,  p. 81,  or Walch, A.  (2015),
N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 18, p. 837.
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sorted, physical distance does not have to play any role in deciding about
which stock exchanges are to be connected.
3. PERSONAL DATA
The scope of the definition of personal data is rather broad, namely thanks
to the criterion  of ‘identifiability’.  It  is  under permanent  discussion  of legal
academics  across  Europe whether  the meaning  of ‘identifiability’  is  in this
case  subjective  or objective,  i.e. whether  a controller  shall  obey  the rules
upon the data being subjectively identifiable by that controller or objectively
(theoretically).12
The Court  of Justice  of the EU  recently  ruled  for the subjective
interpretation  that  is  slightly  more  restrictive  (the court  ruled  that
an internet service provider is considered a controller of personal data if it 
“has  the legal  means  which  enable  it  to identify  the data  subject
with additional  data  which  the internet  service  provider  has  about  that
person”13).
However,  the court  still  upheld  earlier  rather  extensive  approach
to the question as to which data are to be considered identifiable by stating
that even a dynamic IP addresses can be identifiable in the sense of Art. 2(a)
of the Directive 95/46/EC.
Although the subjective interpretation of the definition of personal data
slightly  limits  the scope  of application  of data  protection  rules,  that
limitation  hardly applies  to stock exchanges.  Despite  some personal data
that  are  regularly  communicated  through  interconnections  might  be
anonymised  or pseudonymised,  stock  exchanges  still  hold  means
for reverse  identification  of particular  individuals  (incl.  measures  arising
from AML obligations or KYC procedures).
In result,  stock  exchange  interconnections  inevitably  include
communications  (exchange)  of personal  data  within  the meaning
of Art. 2(a)  of the Directive  95/46/EC.  It  implies  that  whenever
an interconnection  is  made between a stock exchange within  and outside
the EU  (or EEA),  the data  processing  must  comply  with EU  rules
12 See for example Oostveen, M. (2016) Identifiability and the Applicability of Data Protection
to Big Data, International Data Privacy Law, 6(4), p. 299.
13 See Case-C-582/14 Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
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for personal data transfers or even directly with extraterritorially applicable
substantive rules for processing of personal data within the EU.14
Offshore  data  transfers  recently  represented  quite  turbulent  agenda
around  the EU  and it  is  still  not  entirely  clear  which  instruments  will
provide  desired  essential  equivalence  under  the GDPR.15 Despite  all
contemporary  problems  and uncertainties  in EU  data  protection  laws,
the prospect for stock exchange interconnections is relatively optimistic.
The reasons for our optimism were mostly institutional. Stock exchanges
are equipped with state-of-the-art  data security measures  and compliance
procedures.  That  allows  them  to relatively  easily  develop  and maintain
binding  corporate  rules  as envisaged  by Art. 47  of the GDPR  or similar
instruments  that  require  approval  by the respective  data  protection
authority.  If stock  exchange  interconnections  become  popular,  it  is  even
possible  to think  about adopting  specific  certification  schemes
or developing  standard  contractual  clauses  that  would  be  adopted
into interconnection  agreements.  In addition,  the economic  relevance
of stock  exchanges  often  allows  them  to actively  influence  domestic
or foreign  policing  which  might  lead  even  e.g. to the conclusion
of international  agreements  laid  down  in Art. 46(2)(a)  or Art. 46(3)(b).
In any  case,  it  is  advisable  for interconnecting  stock  exchanges  to invest
into the development  of proper  personal  data  transfer  compliance
mechanisms rather than to argue that data protection or data transfer rules
do not apply here.
4. CYBERSECURITY
Stock exchange interconnections obviously require establishment of proper
means  of communication  and data  storage.  As data  represent  absolutely
essential asset for stock exchanges, there is no space for half-way solutions
or compromises. From security standpoint, it would be ideal if substantive
information  systems  used  by stock  exchanges  would  be  entirely
independent  on the Internet.  That  option,  however,  is  not  possible  as it
would  prevent  the availability  of a number  of popular  trading  services.
Consequently, stock exchanges must tackle same security problems as those
14 See  for example  De Hert, P.,  Czerniawski, M.  Expanding  the European  Data  Protection
Scope Beyond Territory:  Article 3 of the General  Data Protection Regulation in its  Wider
Context, International Data Privacy Law, 6(3), p. 230.
15 See for example Bender, D. (2016) Having Mishandled Safe Harbor, Will the CJEU do Better
with Privacy Shield? A US perspective, International Data Privacy Law, 6(2), p. 117.
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that  arise  in any systems connected to the Internet.  Interconnections  then
only extend the scope and placement range of information assets that need
to be secured.
Cybersecurity recently became also a regulatory issue in the EU. The NIS
Directive16 now  brings  entirely  new  compliance  regime  into the national
laws of the member states. Stock exchanges fall within the scope of the NIS
Directive  which  means  that  member  states  include  them  into the count
of institutions  whose  systems  are  obliged  to meet  national  security
standards  incl.  an obligation  to report  security  incidents  to national
response teams.
Compliance  duties  that  are  or shortly  will  be  laid  down  in the laws
of the member  states  upon the NIS  Directive17 do  not  obstruct  stock
exchange  interconnections.  They  only  require  stock  exchanges  to build
technical  means  for interconnections  under  same  security  standards
and cover them with same operational duties as the rest of their information
and communication infrastructures.18
At first,  we  do  not  expect  any serious  problems  regarding  technical
compliance of stock exchanges with security standards that are or will  be
laid  down  in EU  member  states.  Most  financial  institutions  incl.  banks,
stock  exchanges,  insurance  and reinsurance  companies  etc.  already  have
in place  strong  cybersecurity  measures  that  comfortably  meet  or often
exceed new legal requirements. Thus, we might expect that only attention
will  mostly  have  to be  paid  to organisational  adoption  of existing
cybersecurity  measures  to new  security  standards,  documentation
and establishment of incident reporting functionalities.
It  might  become  problematic  for establishing  technically  and legally
functioning  interconnection  between  stock  exchanges  namely
if cybersecurity  standards  laid  down in respective  countries  substantially
differ.  In that  case,  there  will  be  a need  for the development  of technical
and/or organisational  security  interface  that  would  properly  incorporate
the interconnection into compliance structures on both sides.19
16 See Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016
concerning  measures  for a high  common  level  of security  of network  and information
systems across the Union.
17 The Directive shall be legislatively implemented by the member states by 9 May 2018.
18 Interconnections  infrastructures  fall  within  class  4  (Financial  market  infrastructures)
according to Annex II of the NIS Directive.
19 NIS Directive does not provide for any equivalence regime, so compliance has to be tackled
specifically within and outside the EU.
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Not  legally  required  but highly  advisable  for contractual  framework
of interconnections  are  measures  for mutual  sharing  of data
on cybersecurity  incidents  between  interconnected  stock  exchanges.20
If these security data are shared, it can provide for higher level of mutual
credibility.  In addition,  it  can  also  increase  the probability  of detecting
serious  incidents  on both  sides  and improve  consequent  response
capabilities.
Data  on cybersecurity  incidents  are  not  important  only  for stock
exchanges as such. Regulators of various capital markets also require listed
companies  to report  significant  cybersecurity  incidents  that  occurred
in their  infrastructures.  The reason  is  that  cybersecurity  incidents  might
directly  affect  operations  of listed  companies  and influence  the value
of their  shares.21 It  then  hugely  depends  on particular  details  of such
reporting obligations of listed companies, namely on types of compulsorily
reported incidents, structure of reports or timeframes, but there is no doubt
these  data do not  just  have value for investors,  but they might  also give
a very good picture about security situation in respective country.
If cybersecurity  data  of listed  companies  are  subject  to data  exchange
within  stock  exchange  interconnection,  they  might  become,  one  way
or another, transparent to security institutions in respective foreign country.
That  can represent  serious  concern for national  security.  On the contrary,
a stock  exchange  interconnection  can  be  even  utilised  by security
institutions  on both  sides,  because  it  can  provide  them  with a mutually
secure  channel  through  which  they  can  get  potentially  valuable
cybersecurity data from another country including sophisticated analytics.22
Thus, the availability of cybersecurity data about listed companies through
stock exchange interconnections can represent security risk or security asset,
depending  on how  respective  security  institutions  are  able  to cooperate
with participating stock exchanges (it is needless to add here that we do not
expect stock exchange interconnections to be established between countries
with substantially diverse security interests).
20 These  might  include  exchange  of periodic  security  reports  or even  real-time  exchange
of incident reporting and/or incident management  data between incident response teams
on both  sides.  There  already  exist  numerous  technologies  for such  data  sharing,
e.g. the IODEF or IDMEF data formats.
21 See for example Bledstein, N.  (2013) Is Cyber Espionage a Form of Market Manipulation.
Journal of Law & Cyber Warfare, 2(1), p. 104.
22 For  more detailed  description  of international  cooperation  schemes  in cybersecurity,  see
for example  Gross, O.  (2015)  Cyber  Responsibility  to Protect:  Legal  Obligations  of States
Directly Affected by Cyber-Incidents, Cornell International Law Journal, 48, p. 481.
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Cybersecurity and protection of personal data do not represent only data-
-related legal issues  of stock exchange interconnections.  Legal  framework
for interconnection of stock exchanges out of which at least one is in the EU
has always to tackle other issues such as sui generis rights to databases, anti-
-money  laundering  reporting  obligations  etc.  In addition,  international
interconnections  are  always  burdened  with general  questions
of contemporary  cyberlaw  such  as delimitation  of state  jurisdictions,
liability  of information  society  service  providers,  competence  conflicts
of regulators  (financial  markets,  telecommunications,  competition)23 etc.
However,  none  of these  issues  is  fatal  for establishment  or functioning
of stock exchange interconnections as such.
Even the Brexit does not represent with regards to data-related laws any
serious  obstacle  or source  of fatal  uncertainties  for further  development
of interconnection  projects  between  stock  exchanges  in the UK  and those
in other EU member states or elsewhere. It is now mostly clear that UK is
about  to keep  the existing  EU  legal  regulatory  framework  for data
processing and cybersecurity, so interconnections can be further developed
according to the existing EU regulatory standards.24
Consequently, the conclusions with regards to rights related to data are
rather  positive.  Instead  of general  or fatal  obstacles  we  found  only
particular  regulatory issues  that  can be resolved mostly through diligent
compliance mechanisms.
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